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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EMPIRICS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether the Solow growth model is
consistent with the international variation in the standard of
living. It shows that an augmented Solow model that includes
accumulation of human as well as physical capital provides an
excellent description of the cross—country data. The model
explains about 80 percent of the international variation in income
per capita, and the estimated influences of physical—capital
accumulation, human—capital accumulation, and population growth
confirm the model's predictions. The paper also examines the
implications of the Solow model for convergence in standards of
living-—that is, for whether poor countries tend to grow faster
than rich countries. The evidence indicates that, holding
population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries
converge at about the rate the augmented Solow model predicts.
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This paper takes Robert Solow aeriously. In his classic 1956
article, Solow proposed that we begin the study of economic growth by
assuming a standard neoclassical production function with decreasing
returns to capital. Taking the rates of saving and population growth as
exogenous, he showed that these two variables determine the steady-state
level of income per capita. Because saving and population growth rates
vary across countries, different countries reach different steady states.
Solow's model gives simple testable predictions about how these variables
influence the steady-state level of income. The higher the rate of
saving, the richer the country. The higher the rate of population growth,
the poorer the country.
This paper argues that the predictions of the Solow model are, to a
first approximation, consistent with the evidence. Examining recently
available data for a large set of countries, we find that saving and
population growth affect income in the direction that Solow predicted.
Moreover, more than half of the cross-country variation in income per
capita can be explained by these two variables alone.
Yet all is not right for the Solow model. Although the model
correctly predicts the direction of the affects of saving and population
growth, it does not correctly predict the magnitudes. In the data, the
effects of saving and population growth on income are too large. To
understand the relation between saving, population growth, and income, one
must go beyond the textbook Solow model.
We therefore augment the Solow model by including accumulation ofhuman as well as physical capital. The exclusion of human capital from
the textbook Solow model can potentially explain why the estimated
influences of saving and population growth appear too large, for two
reasons. First, for any given rats of human-capital accumulation, higher
saving or lower population growth leads to a higher level of income and
thus a higher level of human capital; hence, accumulation of physical
capital and population growth have greater impacts on income when
accumulation of human capital is taken into account. Second, human-
capital accumulation may be correlated with saving rates and population
growth rates; this would imply that omitting human-capital accumulation
biases the estimated coefficients on saving and population growth.
To test the augmented Solow model, we include a proxy for human-
capital accumulation as an additional explanatory variable in our cross-
country regressions. We find that accumulation of human capital is in
fact correlated with saving and population growth. Including human-
capital accumulation lowers the estimated effects of saving and population
growth to roughly the values predicted by the augmented Solow model.
1oreover, the augmented model accounts for about eighty percent of the
cross-country variation in income. Given the inevitable imperfections in
this sort of cross-country data, we consider the fit of this simple model
to be remarkable. It appears that the augmented Solow model provides an
almost complete explanation of why some countries are rich and other
countries are poor.
After developing and testing the augmented Solow model, we examine an
issue that has received much attention in recent years: the failure of
countries to converge in per capita income. We argue that one should not
2expect convergence. Rather, the Solow model predicts that countries
generally reach different steady states. We examine empirically the set
of countries for which non-convergence has been widely documented in past
work. We find that once differences in saving and population growth rates
are accounted for, there is convergence at roughly the rate that the model
predicts.
Finally, we discuss the predictions of the Solow modal for
international variation in rates of return and for capital movamants. The
modal predicts that poor countries should tand to have highar rates of
return to physical and human capital. We discuss various evidence that
one might usa to evaluate this prediction. In contrast to many recant
authors, we intarprat the available evidence on rates of raturn as
generally consistent with the Solow modal.
Overall, tha findings raportad in this papar cast doubt on the recant
trend among aconomiats to dismiss the Solow growth modal in favor of
andogenous-growth models that assuma constant or increasing returns to
scala in capital. Onecanexplain much of tha cross-country variation in
incoma while maintaining the assumption of decreasing returns. This
conclusion does not imply. howaver, that the Solow model is a complata
theory of growth: one would like also to undarstand the detarminants of
saving, population growth, end world-wide technological change, all of
which the Solow model treats as exogenous. Nor does it imply that
endoganous-growth models are not important, for thay may provida the right
explanation of world-wide technological change. Ourconclusiondoes
imply, however, that tha Solow modal gives the right answers to tha
questions it is designed to address.
3L...i!be TextbookSolov Model
We begin by reviewing briefly the Solowgrowth model. We focus on
the model's implications for cross-country data.
.IheModel
Solow's model takes the rates of saving, populationgrowth, and
technological progress as exogenous. There are two inputs,capital and
labor, which are paid their marginal products. Weassume a Cobb-Douglas
production function, so production at time tisgiven by
(1) Y(t) —K(t)°(A(t)L(t))° O<a<l,
The notation is standard: Y is output, K capital, Llabor, and A the level
of technology, L arid A are assumed togrow exogenously at rates n and g:
(2) L(t) —L(O)eit
(3) A(t) —
Thenumber of effective units of labor, A(t)L(t),grows at rate n+g.
The model assumes that a constant fraction of
output, a, is invested.
Defining k as the stock of Capital per effective unit oflabor, k —K/AL,
and y as the level of output per effective unit of
labor, y —Y/AL,the
evolution of k is governed by
(4) k(t) —sy(t) (n+gs-6)k(t)
—sk(t)°-(n+g+6)k(t)
where 6 is the rate of depreciation. Equation (4)
implies that k
* *0 * convergesto a steady-state value k defined by sk —(n+g+6)k
,or
(5) k* —
Thesteady-state Capital-labor ratio is related positively to therate of
4saving and negatively to tha rata of population growth.
The cantral predictions of tha Solow modal concarn tha impact of
saving and population growth on real income. Subatituting (5) into the
production function and taking loga, we find that steady-state income per
capita is
(6) ln [Y(t)/L(t)] —inA(0) +gt+j2_
in(s) -y ln(n+g+5).
Because the model assumes that factors are paid their marginal products,
it predicts not only the signs but also the magnitudes of the coefficients
on saving and population growth. Specifically, because capital's share in
income (o) is roughly 1/3, the modal implies an elasticity of income per
capita with respect to the saving rete of approximately 0.5 and an
elasticity with respect to n+g+6 of -0.5.
B. Soecification
The natural question to consider is whether the data support the
Solow model's predictions concerning the determinants of standards of
living. In other words, we want to investigate whether real income is
higher in countries with higher saving rates and lower in countries with
higher values of n+g+5.
Weassume that g and S areconstantacross countries. g reflects
primarily the advancement of knowledge, which is not country-specific.
And there is neither any strong reason to expect depreciation rates to
vary greatly across countries nor any data that would allow us to estimate
country-specific depreciation rates. In contrast, the A(0) term reflects
not just technology but resource endowments, climate, institutions, and so
5on; it may therefore differ across countries. We assume
in A(O) —a+,
wherea is a constant andis a country-specific shock. Thus, log incore
percapita at a given time- -time 0for simplicity- -is
(7) ln(Y/L) —a+in(s)-j• ln(n+g+6)+c.
Equation (7)isour basic empirical specification in this section.
We assume that the rates of saving and population growth are
independent of country-specific factors shifting the production function.
That is, we assume that s and n areindependentof .Thisassumption
implies that we can estimate equation (7) with ordinary least squares
(5)l
There are three reasons for Baking for this assumption of
independence. First, this assumption isBadenot only in the Solow model,
but also in •any standard models of economic growth. In any model in
whichsavingand population growth are endogenous but preferences are
ieo.lastic, aand nare unaffected by s. In other words, under isoelastic
utility, permanent differences in the level of technology do not affect
saving rates or population growth rates.
Second, much recent theoretical work on growth has been motivated by
informalexaminations of the relationships betweensaving, population
growth, andincome. Many economists have asserted that theSolowmodel
casmotaccount for the internationaldifferences in income, and this
allegedfailure of theSolow model has sti.ulated workonendogenous-
growth theory. For example,PaulRomer (l987,l989a) suggeststhatsaving
hastoo large aninfluenceongrowth andtakesthis to be evidence for
positiveexternalitiesfrom capital accumulation. Similarly, Robert Lucas
6[19881 asserts thatvariationin population growth cannot account for any
substantial variation in real incomes along the lines predicted by the
Solow model. By maintaining the identifying assumption that s and n are
independent of c, we are able to determine whether systematic examination
ofthe dataconfirmsthese informal judgments.
Third, because the model predicts not just the signs but also the
magnitudesof the coefficients on saving andpopulation growth, we can
gaugewhether there are important biases in theestimates obtained with
OLS. As described above, data onfactor shares imply that,if themodel
iscorrect, the elasticities of Y/L with respect to s and n+g+6 are
approximately 0.5 and -0.5. If OLS yields coefficients that are
substantially different from these values, then we can reject the joint
hypothesis that the Solow model and our identifying assumption are
correct.
Another way to evaluate the Solow model would be to imoose on
equation (7) a value of o derived from data on factor shares and then to
ask how much of the cross-country variation in income the model can
account for. That is, using an approach analogous to growth accounting,"
we could compute the fraction of the variance in living standards that is
explained by the mechanism identified by the Solow model.2 In practice,
because we do not have exact estimates of factor shares, we do not
emphasize this growth-accounting approach. Rather,we estimate equation
(7)by OLS and examine the plausibility of the implied factor shares. The
fitof this regression showsthe result of a growth-accounting exercise
performed with the estimated value of .Iftheestimated a differs from
the value obtained a anon from factor shares, we can compare the fitof
7the estimated regression with the fit obtained by imposing the a orion
value.
C. Data and Samoles
The data are from the Real National Accounts recently constructed by
Robert Summers and Alan Heston [1988]. The data set includes real income
government and private consumption, investment, and population for almost
all of the world other than the centrally planned economies. The data are
annual and cover the period 1960-85. We meaaure n as the average rate of
growth of the working-age population, where working age is defined as 15
to 64. We measure s as the average share of real investment (including
government investment) in real COP, and Y/L as real COP in 1985 divided by
the working-age population in that year.
We consider three samples of countries. The most comprehensive
consists of all countries for which data are available other than those
for which oil production is the dominant industry.4 This sample consists
of 98 countries. We exclude the oil producers because the bulk of
recorded GOP for these countries represents the extraction of existing
resources, not value added; one should not expect standard growth models
to account for measured COP in theae countries.5
Our aecond sample excludes countries whoae data receive a grade of
"D from Suers and Heston or whose populations in 1960 were less than
one million. Summers and Heston use the M0Ugradeto identify countries
whose real income figures are based on extremely little primary data;
measurement error is likely to be a greater problem for these countries.
We omit the small countries because the datermination of their real incomemay be dominated by idiosyncratic factors. This sample consists of 75
countries.
Thethird sample consists of the 22 OECD countries with populations
greater than one million. Thie eample has the advantages that the data
appearto be uniformly of high quality and that the variation in omitted
country-specificfactors is likely to be small. But ithas the
disadvantagesthat it is small in size and that it distards much of the
variation in the variables of interest.
Table A-I at the end of the paper presents the countries in each of
the samples and the date.
0. Results
We estimate equation (7) both with and without imposing the
constraint that the coefficients on ln(s) and ln(n+g+6) are equal in
magnitude and opposite in sign.Weassume that gs-& is .05; reasonable
changes in this assumption have little effect on the estimates.6 Table I
reports the results.
Three aspects of the results support the Solow model. First, the
coefficients on saving and population growth have the predicted signs and,
for twoofthe three samples, are highly significant. Second, the
restrictionthat the coefficients on ln(s) and ln(ni-g+6) are equal in
magnitudeandopposite in signisnot rejected in any of the samples.
Third, and perhaps most important, differences in saving and population
growthaccount for a large fraction of the cross-country variation in
income percapita. In the regression for the intermediate sample, for
example, the adjusted R2 is .59.In contrast to the common claim that theSolow model explains" cross-country variation in laborproductivity
largely by appealing to variations in technologies, the tworeadily
observable variables on which the Solow model focuses in factaccount for
most of the variation in income per capita.
Nonetheless, the model is not completely successful, In
particular,
the estimated impacts of saving and labor forcegrowth are much larger
than the model predicts. The value of a implied by the coefficients
should equal capital's share in income, which isroughly 1/3. The
estimates, however, imply an o that is much higher. For example, theo
implied by the coefficient in the constrained regression for the
intermediate sample is .59 (with a standard error of .02).Thus, the data
strongly contradict the prediction that a—l/3.
Because the estimates imply such a high capital share, it is
inappropriate to conclude that the Solow model is successful just because
the regressions in Table I can explain a high fraction of thevariation in
income. For the intermediate sample, for instance, whenwe employ the
growth-accounting" approach described above and constrain the
coefficients to be consistent with an a of 1/3, the adjusted it2 fallsfrom
.59 to .28. Although the excellent fit of the simpleregressions in Table
I is promising for the theory of growth in general- -itimplies that
theories based on easily observable variables maybeable to account for
most of the cross-country variation in real income- -itis not supportive
of the textbook Solow model in particular.
II. Addinm Buran-Cemitel Accurulation to the Solow Model
Economists have long stressed the importance of human capitalto the
10process of growth. One might expect chat ignoring human capital would
lead to incorrect conclusions: John Kendrick [1976] estimates that over
half of the total U.S. capital stock in 1969 was human capital. In this
section we explore the effect of adding human-capital accumulation to the
Solow growth model.
Including human capital can potentially alter either the theoretical
modelling or tha empirical analysis of economic growth. At the
theoretical level, properly accounting for human capital may change one's
view of the nature of the growth process. Lucas [1988], for example,
assumes that although there are decreasing returns to physical-capital
accumulation when human capital is held constant, the returns to all
reproducible capital (human plus physical) are constant. We discuss this
possibility in Section III.
At the empirical level, the existence of human capital can alter the
analysis of cross-country differences; in the regressions in Table I,
human capital is an omitted variable. It is this empirical problem that
we pursue in this section. We first expand the Solow model of Section I
to include human capital. We show how leaving out human capital affects
the coefficients on physical capital investment and population growth. We
then run regressions analogous to those in Table I to ace if proxies for





H is the stock of human capital, and all other variables are defined as
11before. Letbethe fraction of income invested in physical capital and





wherey—Y/AL, k—K/AL, and h—H/a are quantities per effective unit of
labor. Weareassuming that the same production function applies to human
capital,physical capital, andconsumption. In other words, one unit of
consumption can be transformed costlessly into either one unit of physical
capital or one unit of human capital. In addition, we are assuming that
human capital depreciates at the same rate as physical capital. Lucas
[1988] models the production function for human capital as fundamentally
different from that for other goods. We believe that, at least for an
initial examination, it is natural to assume that the two types of
production functions are similar.
We assume that ct-fl<l, which implies that there are decreasing returns
to all capital.(If a-s-fl—l, then there are constant returns to scale in
the reproducible factors. In this case, there is no steady state for this
model.We discussthis possibility in Section III.) Equations (9a) and
(9b) imply that the economy converges to a steady state defined by:
* 1-flfi1/(l-o-fl)
(10) k —[khJ n+g+6
*- a1-a -1l/(l-a-$)
h—[kh J n+g+6
Substituting(10) into the production function and taking logs gives an
equation for income per capita similar to equation (6) above:




This equation shows how income per capita depends on population growth and
accumulation of physical and human capital.
Like the textbook Solow model, the augmented model predicts
coefficients in equation (11) that are functions of the factor shares. As
before, o is physical capital's share of income, so we expect a value of a
of about 1/3. Gauging a reasonable value of fi,humancapital's share, is
more difficult. In the United States, the minimum wage--roughly the
return to labor without human capital- -has averaged about 30 to 50 percent
of the average wage in manufacturing. This fact suggests that 50 to 70
percent of total labor income represents the return to human capital, or
that fiisbetween 1/3 and 1/2.
Equation (11) makes two predictions about the regressions run in
Section I, in which human capital wasignored.First, even if is
independent of the other right-hand aidevariables,the coefficient on
ln(sk) is greater than o/(l-a). For example, if a——1/3, then the
coefficient on would be 1. Because higher saving leads to higher
income, it leads to a higher steady-state level of human capital, even if
the percentage of income devoted to human-capital accumulation is
unchanged. Hence, the presence of human-capital accumulation increases
the impact of physical-capital accumulation on income.
Second, the coefficient on ln(n+g+6) is larger in absolute value than
thecoefficient on ln(sk). If ——l/3, for example, the coefficient on
13ln(n+g+6) would be -2. In this model, high population growth lowers
income per capita because the amounts of both physical and human capital
must be spread more thinly over the population.
There is an alternative way to express the role of human capital in
determining income in this model. Combining (11) with the equation for
the steady.state level of human capital given in (10) yields an equation
for income as a function of the rate of investment in physical Capital,
the rate of population growth, and the jgJ of human capital:
(12) ln[Y(t)/L(t)} —inA(0) +gt+j ln(s)
0 * - j—ln(n+g+fl +1-0ln(h ).
Equation(12) is almost identical to equation (6) in Section I. In that
model, the level of human capital is a component of the error term.
Because the saving and population growth rates influence h*, one should
expect human capital to be positively correlated with the saving rate and
negatively correlated with population growth. Therefore, omitting the
human-capital term biases the coefficients on saving and population
growth.
The model with human capital suggests two possible ways to modify our
previous regressions. One way is to estimate the augmented model's
reduced form, that is, equation (11), in which the rate of human-capital
&ccumulation ln(sh) is added to the right-hand side. The second way is to
estimate equation (12), in which the level of human capital ln(h) is
added to the right-hand side. Notice that these alternative regressions
predict different coefficients on the saving and population growth terms.
When testing the augmented Solow model, a primary question is whether the
available data on human capital correspond more closely to the rate of
14accumulation or to the level of humancapital(h).
E. Date
To implement the model, we restrict our focus to human-capital
investment in the form of education--thus ignoring investment in health,
among other things. Despite this narrowed focus, measurement of human
capital presents great practical difficulties. Most important, a large
part of investment in education takes the form of forgone labor earnings
on the part of students.8 This problem is difficult to overcome because
forgone earnings very with the level of human.capital investment: a worker
with little human capital forgoes a low wage in order to accumulate more
human capital, whereas a worker with much human capital forgoes a higher
wage. In addition, explicit apending on education takes place at all
levels of government as well as by the family, which wakes spending on
education hard to measure. Finally, not all spending on education is
intended to yield productive human capital: philosophy, religion, and
literature, for example, althougi serving in part to train the mind, might
also be a form of consumption.9
We use a proxy for the rate of human-capital accumulation that
measures approximately the percentage of the working-age population that
is in secondary school. We begin with data on the fraction of the
eligible population (aged 12 to 17) enrolled in secondary school, which we
obtained from the UNESCO yearbook. We then multiply this enrollment rate
by the fraction of the working-age population that is of school age(aged
15to 19). This variable, which we call SCHOOL, is clearly imperfect: the
ageranges in the two data series are not exactly the same, the variable
15does not include the input of teachers, and it completely ignores primary
4!
and higher eduction. Yet if SCHOOL is proportional to 5h' then we can use
it to estimate equation (11); the factor of proportionality will affect
only the constant term.1°
Thismeasure indicates that investment in physical capital and
population growth may be proxying for human-capital accumulation in the
regressions in Table I. The correlation between SCHOOL and I/COP is .59
for the intermediate sample, and the correlation between SCHOOL and the
population growth rate is -.38.Thus, including human-capital
accumulation could alter substantially the estimated impact of physical-
capital accumulation and population growth on income per capita.
C. Results
Table II presents regressions of the log of income per capita on the
log of the investment rate, the log of n+g+5, and the log of the
percentage of the population in secondary school. The human-capital
measure enters significantly in all three samples. It also greatly
reduces the size of the coefficient on physical capital investment and
improves the fit of the regression compared to Table I. These three
variables explain almost 80 percent of the cross-country variation in
income per capita in the non-oil and intermediate samples.
The results in Table TI strongly support the augmented Solow model.
Equation (11) shows that the augmented model predicts that the
coefficients on ln(I/Y), ln(SCHOOL), and ln(n+g+6) sum to zero. The
bottom half of Table II shows that, for all three samples, this
restriction is not rejected. The last lines of the table give the values
16of a and fiimpliedby the coefficients in the restricted regression. For
non-oil end intermediate samples, a and ftareabout 1/3 and highly
significant. The estimates for the OECD alone are less precise. In this
eample, the coefficients on investment and population growth are not
statistically significant: but they also are not significantly different
from the estimates obtained in the larger samples.
We conclude that adding human capital to the Solow model improves its
performance. Allowing for human cepital eliminates the worrisome
anomalies- -the high coefficients on investment end on population growth in
our table I regressions- -that arise when the textbook Solow model is
confronted with the data. The parameter estimates seem reasonable. And
even using an imprecise proxy for human capital, we are able to dispose of
a fairly large part of the model's residual variance.
III. Endoaenous Growth and Converaence
Over the past few years, economists studying growth have turned
increasingly to endogenous-growth models. These models are characterized
by the asaumption of non-decreasing returns to the set of reproducible
factors of production. For example, our model with physical and human
capital would become an endogenous-growth model if m+$—l.Amongthe
implications of this assumption are that countries that save more grow
faster indefinitely and that countries need not converge in income per
capita, even if they have the same preferences and technology.
Advocates of endogenous-growth models present them as alternatives to
the Solow model and motivate them by en alleged empirical failure of the
Solow model to explain cross-country differences. For example, Robert
17Barro [1989] writes,
"In neoclassical growth models with diminishing returns, such as
Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), a country's per capita
growth rate tends to be inversely related to its starting level of
income per person. Therefore, in the absence of shocks, poor and
rich countries would tend to converge in terms of levels of per
capita income. However, this convergence hypothesis seems to be
inconsistent with the cross-country evidence, which indicates that
per capita growth rates are uncorrelated with the starting level of
per capita product."
Ourfirstgoal in this section is to reexamine this evidence on
convergence to assess whether it contradicts the Solow model.
Oursecondgoal is to generalize our previous results. To implement
the Solow model, we have been assuming that countries in 1985 were in
their steady states (or, more generally, that the deviations from steady
state were random). Yet this assumption is questionable. We therefore
examine the predictions of the augmented Solow model for behavior out of
the steady state.
A.Theory
The Solow model predicts that countries reach different steady
states. In Section II we argued that much of the cross-country
differences in income per capita can be traced to differing determinants
of the iteady state in the Solow growth model: accumulation of human and
18physical capital and population growth. Thus, the Solow model does
predict convergence; it predicts oniy that income per capita in a given
country converges to that country'ssteady-statevalue. In other words,
the Solow model predicts convergence only after controlling for the
determinants of the steady state, a phenomenon which might be called
"conditional convergence.
In addition, the Solow model makes quantitative predictions about the
*
speed of convergence to steady state. Let y be the steady-state level of
income per effective worker given by equation (11), and let y(t) be the
actual value at time t. Approximating around the steady state, the speed
of convergence is given by





For example, if a—$—l/3 and n+g+6—.06, then the convergence rate (A) would
equal .02. This implies that the economy moves halfway to steady state in
about 35 years. Notice that the textbook Solow model, which excludes
htan capital, implies much faster convergence. If —O, then A becomes
.04, end the economy moves halfway to steady state in about 17 years.
The model suggests a natural regression to study the rate of
convergence. Equation(13)implies
(14) ln(y(t)) —(1e_At)ln(y*)+ etln(y(0)),
where y(0) is income per effective worker at some initial date.
Subtracting ln(y(0)) from both sides:
(15) ln(y(t)) -ln(y(0))—(l_et)ln(y*)
-(l_et)ln(y(0)).
19Finally, substituting for y*:
(16) ln(y(t)) -ln(y(O))—(1et)jSj ln(sk) +(let)jj ln(s)
-(let)2 ln(n+g+6) -(let)ln(y(C)).
Thus, in the Solow model, the growth of income is s function of the
determinants of the ultimate stesdy state and the initial level of income.
Endogenous-growth models make predictions very different from the
Solow model regarding convergence among countries. In endogenous-growth
models, there is no steady-state level of income; differences among
countries in income per capita can peraist indefinitely, even if the
countries have the same saving and population growth rates.12 Endogenous
growth models with a single sector- -thosewith the "Y—AX" production
function--predict no convergence of any sort. That is, these simple
endogenous-growth models predict a coefficient of zero on y(O) in the
regression in (16). As Barro (1989) notes, however, endogenous growth
models with more than one sector may imply convergence if the initial
income of a country ia correlated with the degree of imbalance among
aectors.
before presenting the results, we note one potential aource of bias
in estimating the rate of convergence from equation (16). Suppose
countries have permanent differences in their production functiona, that
Is, different A(O)'s. These differencea would lead to differences in
initial incomes that would be uncorrelated with subsequent growth rates.
Hence, cross-country differences in the A(O)'a would bias the coefficient
on initial income toward zero and thus bias the resulta against finding
20convergence.
5. Results
We now test the convergence predictions of the Solow model. We
report regressions of the change in the log of income per capita over the
period 1960 to 1985 on the log of income per capita in 1960. with and
without controlling for investment, growth of the working-age population,
and school enrollment.
In Table III. the log of income per capita appears alone on the
right-hand side.This table reproduces the results of many previous
authors on the failure of incomes to converge (Bradford DeLong 1988, Paul
Romer 1987). The coefficient on the initial level of income per capita
is slightly positive for the non-oil sample and zero for the intermediate
sample, and for both regressions the adjusted R2 is essentially zero.
There is no tendency for poor countries to grow faster on average than
rich countries.
Table III does show, however, that there is a significant tendency
toward convergence in the OECD sample. The coefficient on the initial
level of income per capita is significantly negative, and the adjusted
of the regression is .46. This result confirms the findings of Steve
Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen [1989], among others.
Table IV adds our measures of the rates of investment and population
growth to the right-hand eide of the regression. In all three samples,
the coefficient on the initial level of income is now significantly
negative--that is, there is strong evidence of convergence. Moreover, the
inclusion of investment and population growth rates improves substantially
21the fit of the regression. Table V adds our measure of human capital to
the right-hand side of the regression in Table IV. This new variable
lowers further the coefficient on the initial level of income, and it
again improves the fit of the regression.
Figure 1 presents a graphical demonstration of the effect of adding
measures of population growth and accumulation of human and physical
capital to the usual "convergence picture," first presented by Paul Romer
(1987]. The top panel presents a scatterplot for our intermediate sample
of the average ennual growth rate of income per capita from 1960 to 1985
against the log of income per capita in 1960. Clearly, there is no
evidence that countries that start off poor tend to grow faster. The
second panel of the figure partials out the logs of the investment rate
and (n+g+6) from both the income level and growth rate variables. This
figure shows that if countries did not vary in their investment and
population growth rates, there would be a strong tendency for poor
countries to grow fester than rich ones. The third panel of Figure 1
partials out our human-capital variable in addition to investment and
population growth rates; the tendency toward convergence is now even
stronger.
The results in Tables IV and V are notable not only for the finding
of convergence, but also for the rate at which convergence occurs. The
implied values of A, the parameter governing the speed of convergence, are
derived from the coefficient on ln(Y60). The values in Table IV era much
smaller than the textbook Solow model predicts. Yet the estimates in
Table V are closer to what the augmented Solow model predicts, for two
reasons. First, the augmented model predicts a slower rate of convergence
22than the model without human capital. Second, the empirical results
including human capital imply a faster rate of convergence than the
empirical results without human capital. Hence, once again, the inclusion
of human capital can help explain some results that appear anomalous from
the vantage pbint of the textbook Solow model.
Table VI presents estimates of equation (16) imposing the restriction
that the coefficients on ln(sk). ln(sh) and ln(n+g+5) sum to zero. We
find that this restriction is not rejected and that imposing it has little
effect on the coefficients.The last lines in Table VI present the
implied values of a and fi.Theestimates of a range from .38 to .48, and
the estimates of $are.23 in all three samples. Compared to the results
in Table II, these regressions give a somewhat larger weight to physical
capital and a somewhat smaller weight to human capital.
In contrast to the results in Tables I through IV, the results for
the OECD sample in Tables V and VI are similar to those for the other
samples. An interpretation that reconciles the similarity across samples
here and the dissimilarity in the earlier specifications is that
departures from steady state represent a larger share of cross-country
variation in income per capita for the OECD than for the broader samples.
If the OECD countries are far from their steady states, then population
growth and capital accumulation have not yet had their full impact on
standards of living; hence, we obtain lower estimated coefficients and
lower 1t2's for the OECD in specifications that do not consider out-of-
steady-state dynamics. Similarly, the greater importance of departures
from steady state for the OECD would explain the finding of greater
unconditional convergence. We find this interpretation plausible: World
23War II surely caused large departures from the steady state, and it surely
hadlargereffects on the OECD than on the rest of the world. With a
value of A of .02, almost half of the departure from steady state in 1945
would have remained by the end of our sample in 1985.
Overall, our interpretation of the evidence on convergence contrasts
sharply with that of endogenous-growth advocates.In particular, we
believe that the study of convergence does not show a failure of the Solow
model. After controlling for those variables that the Solow model says
determine the steady state, there is substantial convergence in income per
capita. Moreover, convergence occurs at approximately the rate that the
model predicts.
IV. Interest Rate Differentials and Cavital Movements
Recently, several economists, including Robert Lucas [1988], Robert
Barro [1989], and Robert King and Sergio Rebelo [1989] ,haveemphasized an
objection to the Solow model in addition to those we have addressed so
far: they argue that the model fails to explain either rate-of-return
differences or international capital flows. In the models of Sections I





Thus,themarginal product of capital varies positively with the
population growth rate and negatively with the saving rate. Because the
cross-country differences in saving and population growth rates are large,
the differences in rates of return should also be large. For example, if
m—l/3, 6—03, and g—.02, then the mean of the steady-state net marginal
24product is .12 in the intermediate sample, and the standard deviation is
.08.13
'Two related facts seem inconsistent with these predictions. First,
observed differentials in real interest rates appear smaller than the
predicted differences in the net marginal product of capital. Second, as
Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka [1980] first documented, countries
with high saving rates have high rates of domestic investment rather than
large current account surpluses: capital does not flow from high-saving
countries to low-saving countries.
Although these two facts indeed present puzzles to be resolved, it is
premature to view them as a basis for rejecting the Solow model. The
Solow model predicts that the marginal product of capital will be high in
low-saving countries, but it does not necessarily predict that real
interest rates will also be high. One can infer the marginal product of
capital from real interest rates on financial assets only if investors are
optimizing and capital markets are perfect. Both of these assumptions are
questionable. It is possible that some of the most productive investments
in poor countries are in public capital, and that the behavior of the
governments of poor countries is not socially optimal. In addition, it is
possible that the marginal product of private capital is also high in poor
countries, yet those economic agents who could make the productive
investments do not do so because they face financing constraints or
because they fear future expropriation.
Some evidence for this interpretation comes from examining
international variation in the rate of profit. If capital earns its
marginal product, then one can measure the marginal product of capital as
25HPK —a/(K/Y).
That is! the return to tapital equals capital's share in income (a)
divided the capital-output ratio (K/Y). The available evidence indicates
that capital's share is roughly constant across counties. Jeffrey Sachs
]l979, Table 3] presents factor shares for the G-7 countries. His figures
show thst variation in these shares across countries and over time is
smallJ4 By contrast, capital-output ratios vary substantiallyacross
countries: accumulating the investment data from Summers and Heston to
produce estimates of the capital stock, one finds that low-saving
countries have capital-output ratios near 1 and high-saving countries ha'-'e
capital-output ratios near 3. Thus, direct measurement of the profit rate
suggests that there is large international variation in the return to
capital.
The available evidence also indicates that expropriation risk is one
reason that capital does not move to eliminate these differences in the
profit rate. Williams [1972] examines the experience of foreign
investment in developing countries from 1956 to 1972. He reports that,
during this period, governments nationalized about 19 percent of foreign
capital, and that compensation averaged about 41 percent of book value.
It is hard to say precisely how much of the observed differences in profit
rates this expropriation risk can explain. Yet, in view of this risk, it
would be surprising if the profit rates were not at least somewhat higher
in developing countries.
Further evidence on rates of return comes from the large literature
on international differences in the return to education. George
J
Paacharopoulos [1985] summarizes the results of studies for over 60
26countries that analyze the determinants of labor earnings using sicro
data. Because forgone wages are the primary cost of education, the rate
of return is roughly the percentage increase in the wage resulting from an
additional year of schooling. He reports that the poorer the country, the
larger the return to schooling.
Overall, the evidence on the return to capital appears consistent
with the Solow model. Indeed, one might argue that it supports the Solow
model against the alternative of endogenous-growth models. Many
endogenous-growth models assume constant returns to scale in the
reproducible factors of production; they therefore imply that the rate of
return should not vary with the level of development. Yet direct
measurement of profit rates end returns to schooling indicate that the
rate of return is much higher in poor countries.
Conclusion
We have suggested that international differences in income per capita
sre best understood using an augmented Solow growth model. In this model,
output is produced from physical capital, human capital, and labor, and is
used for investment in physical capital, investment in human capital, and
consumption. One production function that isconsistentwith our
empirical results is Y—K3H113L1'3.
This model of economic growth has several implications. First, the
elasticity of income with respect to the stock of physical capital is not
substantially different from capital's share in income. This conclusion
indicates, in contrast to Paul Romer's suggestion, that capital receives
approximately its social return. In other words, there are not
27substantial externalities to the accumulation of physical capital.
Second, despite the absence of externalities, the accumulation of
physical capital has a larger impact on income per capita than the
textbook Solow model implies. A higher saving rate leads to higher income
in steady state, which in turn leads to a higher level of human capital,
even if the rate of human-capital accumulation is unchanged. Higher
saving thus raises total factor productivity as it is usually measured.
This difference between the textbook and the augmented model is
quantitatively important. The textbook Solow model with a capital shate
of 1/3 indicates that the elasticity of income with respect to the saving
rate is 1/2. Our augmented Solow model indicates that this elasticity is
Third, population growth also has a larger impact on income per
capita than the textbook model indicates. In the textbook model, higher
population growth lowers income because the available capital must be
spread more thinly over the population of workers. In the augmented
model, human capital also must be spread more thinly, implying that higher
population growth lowers measured total factor productivity. Again, this
effect is important quantitatively. In the textbook model with a capital
share of 1/3, the elasticity of income per capita with respect to n+g+6 is
-1/2. In our augmented model, this elasticity is -2.
Fourth, our model has implications for the dynamics of the economy
when the economy is not in steady state. In contrast to endogenous-growth
models, this model predicts that countries with similar technologies end
rates of accumulation and population growth should converge in income per
capita. Yet this convergence occurs more slowly than the textbook Solow
28model suggests. The textbook Solow model implies that the economy reaches
halfway to steady state in about 17 years, whereas our augmented Solow
model implies that the economy reaches halfway in about 35 years.
More generally, our results indicate that the Solow model is
consistent with the internationel evidence if one acknowledges the
importance of human as well as physical capital. The sugmented Solow
model says that differences in saving, education, and population growth
should explain cross-country differences in income per capita. Our
examination of the data indicates that these three variables do explain
most of the international variation.
Future research should be directed at explaining why the variables
taken to be exogenous in the Solow model vary so much from country to
country. We expect that differences in tax policies, education policies,
tastes for children, end political stability will end up among the
ultimate determinants of cross-country differences. We also expect that
the Solow model will provide the best framework for understanding how
these determinants influence a country's level of economic well-being.
Harvard University
University of California at Eerkeley
BrownUniversity
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31Table I: Estiaatjon of the Textbook Solos, Model
Dependent Variable: log CD? per working-age person in 1985
Sample: Non-oil Intermediate DECO
Observations: 98 75 22
CONSTANT 5.48 5.36 7.97
(1.59) (1.55) (2.48)
ln(I/CD?) 1.42 1.31 .50
(.14) (.17) (.43)
ln(n-+.g+6) -1.97 -2.01 -.76
(.56) (.53) (.84)
.59 .59 .01
s.e.c. .69 .61 .38
Restricted Regression:
CONSTANT 6.87 7.10 8.62
(.12) (.15) (.53)
ln(I/CD?)- 1.48 1.43 .56
ln(n+g+6) (.12) (.14) (.36)
.59 .59 .06
s.e.c. .69 .61 .37
Test of restriction:
p-value .38 .26 .79
Implied a .60 .59 .36
(.02) (.02) (.15)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The investment and population
growth rates are averages for the period 1960-1985. (g+6) is assumed to be
0.05.
32Table II: Estimation of the Ausmented Solow Model
Dependent Variable: log GDP per working-age person in 1965
Sample: Non-oil Intereediate OECD
Observations: 98 75 22
CONSTANT 6.89 7.81 8.63
(1.17) (1.19) (2.19)
ln(I/CDP) .69 .70 .28
(.13) (.15) (.39)
ln(n+g+6) -1.73 -1.50 -1.07
(.41) (.40) (.75)
ln(SCHOOL) .66 .73 .76
(.07) (.10) (.29)
.78 .77 .24
s.e.c. .51 .45 .33
Restrictedregression:
CONSTANT 7.86 7.97 8.71
(.14) (.15) (.47)
ln(I/GDP)- .73 .71 .29
ln(n+g+5) (.12) (.14) (.33)
ln(SCHOOL)- .67 74 .76
ln(n+gi-S) (.07) (.09) (.28)
.78 77 .28
s.e.c. .51 .45 .32
Test of restriction:
p-value .41 .89 .97
Implied a .31 .29 .14
(.04) (.05) (.15)
Implied 28 .30 .37
(.03) (.04) (.12)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The investment and population
growth rates are averages for the period 1960-1985. (g+6) is assumed to be
0.05. SCHOOL is theaveragepercentage of the working-age population in
secondary school for the period 1960-1985.
33Table III: Tests for Unconditional Conversance
Dependent Variable: log difference COP per working-age parson 1960-85
Sample: Non-oil Intermediate OECD
Observations: 98 75 22
CONSTANT -.266 .587 3.69
(.380) (.433) (.68)
ln(Y60) .0943 -.00423 -.341
(.0496) (.05484) (.079)
.03 -.01 .46
s.e.c. .44 .41 .18
Implied A -.00360 .00017 .0167
(.00219) (.00218) (.0023)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Y60 is COP per working-age person
in 1960.
34Table IV: Tests for Conditional Coverence
Dependent Variable: log difference CDP per working-age person 1960-85
Sample: Non-oil Intermediate OECD
Observations: 98 75 22
C0NSTANT 1.93 2.23 2.19
(.83) (.86) (1.17)
ln(Y60) -.141 -.228 -.351
(.052) (.057) (.066)
ln(I/CDP) .647 .644 .392
(.087) (.104) (.176)
ln(n-ig+8) -.299 -.464 -.753
(.304) (.307) (.341)
.38 .35 .62
s.e.c. .35 .33 .15
Implied . .00606 .0104 .0173
(.00182) (.0019) (.0019)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Y60 is CD? per working-age persor
in 1960. The investment and population growth rates are averages for the
period 1960-1985. (g+8) is assumed to be 0.05.
35Ib1e Vt Tests for Conditional Convergence
Dependent Variable: log difference GDP per working-age person 1960-85
Sample: Non-oil Intermediate OECD
Observations: 98 75 22





ln(I/CDP) .524 .538 .335
(.087) (.102) (.174)
ln(n+g+8) -.505 -.551 -.844
(.288) (.288) (.334)
ln(SCHOOL) .233 .271 .223
(.060) (.081) (.144)
.46 .43 .65
s.e.e. .33 .30 .15
Implied ). .0137 .0182 .0203
(.0019) (.0020) (.0020)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Y60 is GDP per working-age person
in 1960. The investment and population growth rates are averages for the
period 1960-1985. (g+6) is assumed to be 0.05. SCHOOL is the average
percentage of the working-age population in secondary school for the period
19 60-1985.
36Table VI: Tests for Conditional Convergence. Restricted Reeression
Dependent Variable: log difference CDP per working-age person 1960-85
Sample: Non-oil Intermediate OECD
Observations: 98 75 22
CONSTANT 2.46 3.09 3.55
(.48) (.53) (.63)
ln(Y60) -299 -.372 -.402
(.061) (.067) (.069)
ln(I/GDP)- .500 .506 .396
ln(n+g+6) (.082) (.095) (.152)
ln(SCHOOL)- .238 .266 .236
ln(n+g+8) (.060) (.080) (.141)
.46 .44 .66
s.e.c. .33 .30 .15
Test of restriction:
p-value .40 .42 .47
Implied A .0162 .0186 .0206
(.0019) (.0019) (.0020)
Implied a .48 .44 .38
(.07) (.07) (.13)
Implied fi .23 .23 .23
(.05) (.06) (.11)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Y60 is GOP per working-age person
In 1960. The investment and population growth rates are averages for the
period 1960-1985. (g+) is assumed to be 0.05. SCHOOL is the average




Sazyle GOP/adultzrowth 1960-85 ia SCHOOL
numbercountry N I 0 1960 1985 GOP working
age pop
1 Algeria 1 1 024854371 4.8 2.624.1 4.5
2 Angola 1 0 01588 1171 0.8 2.1 5.8 1.8
3 Benin 1 0 01116 1071 2.2 2.410.8 1.8
4 Botswana 1 1 0 959 3671 8.6 3.2 28.3 2.9
5 Burkina Faso 1 0 0 529 857 2.9 0.9 12.7 0.4
6 Burundi 1 0 0 755 663 1.2 1.7 5.1 0.4
7 Cameroon 1 10 8892190 5.7 2.1 12.8 3.4
8 Central Afr. Rep. 1 0 0 838 789 1.5 1.7 10.5 1.4
9 Chad 1 00 908 462 -0.9 1.9 6.9 0.4
10 Congo, Peop. Rep. 1 00 10092624 6.2 2.428.8 3.8
11 Egypt 1 0 0 9072160 6.0 2.516.3 7.0
12 Ethiopia 11 0 533 608 2.8 2.3 5.4 1.1
13 Cabon 0 0 013075350 7.0 1.422.1 2.6
14 Gambia, The 0 0 0 799 3.6 18.1 1.5
15 Ghana 1 0 01009 727 1.0 2.3 9.1 4.7
16 Guinea 0 0 0 746 869 2.2 1.610.9
17 Ivory Coast 1 1 013861704 5.1 4.312.4 2.3
18 Kenya 1 1 0 9441329 4.8 3.417.4 2.4
19 Lesotho 0 0 0 431 1483 6.8 1.912.6 2.0
20 Liberia 1 0 0 863 944 3.3 3.021.5 2.5
21 Madagascar 1 1 01194 975 1.4 2.2 7.1 2.6
22 M.alawi 1 1 0 455 823 4.8 2.413.2 0.6
23 Mali 1 1 0 737 710 2.1 2.2 7.3 1.0
24 Mauritania 1 0 0 777 1038 3.3 2.2 25.6 1.0
25 Mauritius 1 0 01973 2967 4.2 2.6 17.1 7.3
26 Morocco 1 1 010302348 5.8 2.5 8.3 3.6
27 Mozambique 1 0 01420 1035 1.4 2.7 6.1 0.7
28 Niger 1 0 0 539 841 4.4 2.610.3 0.5
29 Nigeria 1 1 01055 1186 2.8 2.412.0 2.3
30 Rwand.a 1 00 460 696 4.5 2.879 0.4
31 Senegal 1 1 0 1392 1450 2.5 2.3 9.6 1.7
32 Sierra Laone 1 0 0 511 805 3.4 1.610.9 1.7
33 Somalia 10 0 901 657 1.8 3.113.8 1.1
34 S. Africa 11 047687064 3.9 2.321.6 3.0
35 Sudan 1 0 012541038 1.8 2.613.2 2.0
36 Swaziland 0 0 0 817 7.2 17.7 3.7
37 Tanzania 11 0 383 710 5.3 2.918.0 0.5
38 Togo 1 0 0 777 978 3.4 2.515.5 2.9
39 Tunisia 11 016233661 5.6 2.413.8 4.3
40 Uganda 1 0 0 601 667 3.5 3.1 4.1 1.1
Note: Growth rates are In percent per year. I/Y Ia investment as a
percentage of GOP, and SCHOOL is the percentage of the working-age population
in secondary school, both averaged for the period 1960-85.
38Table A-I --continued
Samole CDP/adultzrowth 1960-85 LLXSCHOOL
numbercountry N I 0 1960 1985 COPworking
age pop
41 Zaire 1 0 0 594 412 0.9 2.4 6.5 3.6
42 Zambia 1 1 014101217 2.1 2.731.7 2.4
43 Zimbabwe 1 1 011872107 5.1 2.821.1 4.4
44 Afghanistan 0 0 01224 1.6 6.9 0.9
45 Bahrain 0 0 0 30.0 12.1
46 Bangladesh 1 1 0 8461221 4.0 2.6 6.8 3.2
47 Burma 1 1 0 517 1031 4.5 1.711.4 3.5
48 Hong Kong 11 03085 13372 8.9 3.0 19.9 7.2
49 India 11 0 978 1339 3.6 2.4 16.8 5.1
50 Iran 0 0 036067400 6.3 3.4 18.4 6.5
51 Iraq 0 0 0 49165626 3.8 3.216.2 7.4
52 Israel 11 0 4802 10450 5.9 2.828.5 9.5
53 Japan 1113493 13893 6.8 1.236.0 10.9
54 Jordan 11 021834312 5.4 2.717.6 10.8
55 Korea, Rep. of 11 012854775 7.9 2.722.3 10.2
56 Kuwait 0 0 0 77881 25635 2.4 6.8 9.5 9.6
57 Malaysia 1 1 021545788 7.1 3.223.2 7.3
58 Nepal 1 0 0 833 974 2.6 2.0 5.9 2.3
59 Oman 0 0 0 15584 3.315.6 2.7
60Pakistan 1 1 010772175 5.8 3.012.2 3.0
61 Philippines 11 0166824304.5 3.014.9 10.6
62 Saudi Arabia 0 0 06731 11057 6.1 4.112.8 3.1
63 singapore 1 1 02793 14678 9.2 2.632.2 9.0
64 Sri Lanka 1 1 017942482 3.7 2.414.8 8.3
65 Syrian Arab Rep. 1 1 02382 6042 6.7 3.015.9 8.8
66 Taiwan 0 0 0 8.0 20.7
67 Thailand 1 1 013083220 6.7 3.118.0 4.4
68 U. Arab Emirates 0 0 0 18513 26.5
69 Yemen 0 0 0 1918 2.5 17.2 0.6
70 Austria 1115939 13327 3.6 0.423.4 8.0
71 Belgium 1116789 14290 3.5 0.523.4 9.3
72 Cyprus 0 0 0 2948 5.2 31.2 8.2
73 Denmark 1118551 16491 3.2 0.626.6 10.7
74 Finland 1116527 13779 3.7 0.7 36.9 11.5
75 France 1117215 15027 3.9 1.0 26.2 8.9
76 Germany, Fed Rep 1117695 15297 3.3 0.528.5 8.4
77 Greece 1112257 6868 5.1 0.729.3 7.9
78 Iceland 0 0 08091 3.9 29.0 10.2
79 Ireland 11 14411 8675 3.8 1.125.9 11.4
80 Italy 11 14913 11082 3.8 0.624.9 7.1
Note: Growth rates are in percent per year. I/Y is investment as a
percentage of GDP, and SCHOOL is the percentage of the working-age population
in secondary school, both averaged for the period 1960-85.
39Table A-I -- continued
Sample GOP/adultzrowth 1960-85 Jfl SCHOOL
number country N I 0 1960 1985 GOP working
age pop
81 Luxembourg 0 0 09015 2.8 26.9 5.0
82 Malta 0 0 02293 6.0 30.9 7.1
83 Netherlands 1 1 17689 13177 3.6 1.4 25.8 10.7
84 Norway 1 1 17938 19723 4.3 0.7 29.1 10.0
85 Portugal 1 1 12272 5827 4.4 0.622.5 5.8
86 Spain 111 3766 9903 4.9 1.017.7 8.0
87 Sweden 1117802 15237 3.1 0.424.5 7.9
88 Switzerland 111 10308 15881 2.5 0.829.7 4.8
89 Turkey 1 1 1 22744444 5.2 2.520.2 5.5
90 United Kingdom1 1 17634 13331 2.5 0.318.4 8.9
91 Barbados 0 0 0 3165 4.8 19.5 12.1
92 Canada 1 1 1 10256 17935 4.2 2.023.3 10.6
93 Costa Rica 1 1 033604492 4.7 3.5 14.7 7.0
94 Dominican Rep. 1 1 019393308 5.1 2.9 17.1 5.8
95 El Salvador 1 1 02042 1997 3.3 3.3 8.0 3.9
96 Guatemala 1 1 024813034 3.9 3.1 8.8 2.4
97 Haiti 11 0 1096 1237 1.8 1.3 7.1 1.9
98 Honduras 11 0 1430 1822 4.0 3.113.8 3.7
99 Jamaica 1 1 0 2726 3080 2.1 1.620.6 11.2
100 Mexico 1 1 042297380 5.5 3.319.5 6.6
101 Nicaragua 1 1 0 31953978 4.1 3.314.5 5.8
102 Panama 1 1 0 24235021 5.9 3.026.1 11.6
103 Trinidad +Tobago1 1 09253 11285 2.7 1.920.4 8.8
104 United States 1 1 1 12362 18988 3.2 1.521.1 11.9
105 Argentina 1 1 048525533 2.1 1.5 25.3 5.0
106 Bolivia 1 1 01618 2055 3.3 2.413.3 4.9
107 Brazil 1 1 01842 5563 7.3 2.9 23.2 4.7
108 Chile 1 1 05189 5533 2.6 2.3 29.7 7.7
109 Colombia 1 1 026724405 5.0 3.0 18.0 6.1
110 Ecuador 110 21984504 5.7 2.8 24.4 7.2
111 Guyana 000 2761 1.1 32.4 11.7
112 Paraguay 11 0 19513914 5.5 2.711.7 4.4
113 Peru 11 0 33103775 3.5 2.912.0 8.0
114 Surinam 0 0 0 3226 4.5 19.4 8.1
115 Uruguay 1 1 051195495 0.9 0.611.8 7.0
116 Vanezuela 1 1 0 103676336 1.9 3.811.4 7.0
117 Australia 1 1 18440 13409 3.8 2.031.5 9.8
118 FIji 0 0 03634 4.2 20.6 8.1
119 Indonesia 1 1 0 8792159 5.5 1.9 13.9 4.1
120 New Zealand 1119523 12308 2.7 1.7 22.5 11.9
121 Papua New Guinea 10 01781 2544 3.5 2.1 16.2 1.5
Note: Growth rates are in percent per year. 1/? ia investment as a
percentage of GOP, and SCHOOL ia the percentage of the working-age population
In secondary school, both averaged for the period 1960-85.
401. If a and n are endogenous and influenced by the level of income, then
eatiaatesof equation (7)usingordinaryleast squares are potentially
inconsistent.In this case, to obtain conaistent estimates, one needs to
find instrumental variables that arecorrelatedwith s and n, but
uncorrelated with the country-specific shift in the production function
Finding such instrumental variables is a formidable task, however.
2. In standard growth accounting, factor ahares are usedtodecompose
growth over time in a single country into a part explained by growth in
factor inputs and an unexplained part- -the Solow residual- -which is
usually attributed to technological change. In this cross-country
analogue, factor ahares are used to decompose variation in income across
countries into a part explained by variationin saving and population
growthrates and an unexplained part, which could be attributed to
international differences in the level of technology.
3. Data on the fraction of the population of working age are from the
World Bank'a World Tables and the 1988 World Develooment Reoort.
4. For purposea of comparability, we restrict the sample to countries that
have not only the data uaed in this section, but also the data on human
capital described in Section II.
415. The countries that are excluded on this basis are: Bahrain, Cabon,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and The United Arab Emirates. In
addition, Lesotho is excluded because the sum of private and government
consumption far exceeds COP in every year of the sample, indicating that
labor income from abroad constitutes an extremely large fraction of ON?.
6. We chose this value of g+6 to match the available data. In U.S. data,
the capital consumption allowance is about 10 percent of CUP, and the
capital-output ratio is about 3, which implies that 6 is about .03; Paul
Romer [l989a, p. 60] presents a calculation for a broader sample of
countries and concludes that S is about .03 or .04.In addition, growth
in income per capita has averaged 1.7 percent per year in the United
States and 2.2 percent per year in our intermediate sample; this suggests
that g is about .02.
7. Previous authors have provided evidence of the importance of human
capital for growth in income. Azariadis and Drazen (1990] find that no
country was able to grow quickly during the postwar period without a
highly literate labor force. They interpret this as evidence that there
is a threshold externality associated with human capital accumulation.
Similarly, Rauch (1988] finds that among countries that had achieved 95%
adult literacy in 1960, there was a strong tendency for income per capita
to converge over the period 1950-85. Paul Romer (1989) finds that
literacy in 1960 helps explain subsequent investment and that, if one
corrects for measurement error, literacy has no impact on growth beyond
its effect on investment. There is also older work stressing the role of
42human capital in development; for example, see Anne Krueger [1968] and
Richard Easterlin [1981].
8. Kendrick [1976] calculates that for the U.S. in 1969, total gross
investisent in educetion and training was $192.3 billion, of which $92.3
billion took the form of imputed compensation to students (tables A-l and
3-2).
9. An sdditionsl problem with implementing the augmented model is that
output" in the model is not the same as that measured in the national
income accounts. Much of the expenditure on human capital is forgone
wages, and these forgone wages should be included in Y. Yet measured CDP
fails to include this component of investment spending.
Beck-of-the-envelope celculations suggest that this problem is not
quantitatively important, however. If human capital accumulation is
completely unmeasured, then measured CD? is (l-s)y. One can show that
this measurement problem does not affect the elasticity of CD? with
respect to physical investment or population growth. The elasticity of
measured CD? with respect to human capital accumulation is reduced by
compared to the elasticity of true CD? with respect to human
capital accumulation. Because the fraction of a nation's resources
devoted to human capital accumulation is small, this effect is small. For
example, if o—fi—1/3 and shd then the elasticity will be 0.9 rather than
1.0.
4310. Evenunder the weaker assumption that ln(sh) is linear in ln(SCHOOL),
we can use the estimated coefficients on ln(sk) and ln(n+g+6) to infer
values of a and fi;inthis case, the estimated coefficient on ln(SCHOOL)
will not have an interpretation.
11. As we described in the previous footnote, under the weaker assumption
that ln(sh) is linear in ln(SCHOOL), estimates of a and ficanbe inferred
from the coefficients on ln(I/GD?) and ln(n+g+5) in the unrestricted
regression. When we do this, we obtain estimates of a and filittle
different from those reported in Table TI.
12. Although we do not explore the issue here, endogenous-growth models
also make quantitative predictions about the impact of saving on growth.
The models are typically characterized by constant returns to reproducible
factors of production- -namely physical and human capital. Our model of
Section II with a+$—1 and g—0 provides a simple way of analyzing the
predictions of models of andogenous growth. With these modifications to
the model of Section II, the production function is Y —AKOHI0.In this
form, the model predicts that the ratio of physical to human capital, K/H,
will converge to k'h' and that K, H, and '1 will then all grow at rate
A(sk)0(ah)lm .Thederivative of this "steady-state" growth rate with
respect to is then mA(sh/sk)]m —a/(K/Y).The impact of saving on
growth depends on the exponent on capital in the production function, a,
and the capital-output ratio. In models in which andogenous growth arises
mainly from externalities from physical capital, a is close to one, and
the derivative of the growth rate with respect to is approximately
44or about .4. In models in which endogenous growth arises largely
from human capital accumulation and there are no externalities from
physical capital, the derivative would be about .3/(K/Y), or about .12.
13. There is an alternative way of obtaining the marginal product of
capital, which applies even outside of the steady state but requires an
estimate of fi and the assumption of no country-specific shifts to the
production function. If one assumes that the return on human and physical
capital are equalized within each country, then one can show that the MPK
is proportional to Therefore, for the textbook Solow
model in which o—l/3 and fi—O, the NPK is inversely proportional to the
square of output. As King and Rebelo and others have noted, the implied
differences in rates of return across countries are incredibly large. Yet
if o—$—l/3, then the MPK is inversely proportional to the square root of
output. In this case, the implied cross-country differences in the MPK
are much smaller and are similar to those obtained with equation (17).
14. In particular, there is no evidence that rapid capital accumulation
raises capital's share. Sachs reports that Japan's rapid accumulation in
the 1960s and 1970s, for example, was associated with a rise in labor's
share from 69 percent in 1962-1964 to 77 percent in 1975-1978, See also
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